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PART IV: PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT: ADVICE
TO ACCOUNTANTS AND ATTORNEYS
Stuart J. Filler
The Couch Decision
As stated in Part I, enthusiasm for the Symposium was stimulated by the recent Supreme Court case of Couch v. United
States." ' A thorough analysis of the Court's reasoning in Couch
is a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of what procedures should be established by accountants, attorneys, and others
involved in preparing federal income tax returns or representing
individual taxpayers in federal civil or criminal income tax fraud
investigations or litigation to maximize the protection of the taxpayer's legal rights and privileges. The opinion was written by
Justice Powell and joined in by six other Justices. Justice Brennan, in addition to joining in the majority opinion, wrote a separate concurring opinion, and Justices Douglas "andMarshall each
filed separate dissenting opinions.
Stated simply, the facts of Couch are that the taxpayer,
Lillian Couch, had transferred her tax records to an independent
accountant for purposes of preparing her income tax returns and
retaining the records for use in possible future investigations.
Although the taxpayer surrendered possession, she retained ownership of the records. A special agent of the Intelligence Division
served a summons on the accountant to produce the records. The
accountant refused, and the government sought enforcement of
the summons. The taxpayer moved to intervene to assert her legal
and constitutional rights and privileges.
Relying on Donaldsonv. United States,51 "the Court began its
509. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).

510. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). As reaffirmed in Couch at 326 n.8, the Court in Donaldson
stated, at 536, its holding as follows:
We hold that under §7602 an internal revenue summons may be issued in
aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation
for criminal prosecution.
Less than one month after the Supreme Court's confirmation in Couch of their holding in
Donaldson, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460 (1973)
stated:
Thus, to state that the Court held in Donaldson that the standard for
quashing a §7602 summons is "recommendation for prosecution" standard, is
incorrect. The standard is whether the sole purpose of the issuance of the summons is for criminal prosecution. [Footnote omitted].
The facts in Weingarden were that the summons was served by a revenue agent two
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decision by upholding.the validity of the summons 51' because it
was issued by a special agent in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Also relying on Donaldson,
the Court found that the lower court had not erred in permitting
the taxpayer the opportunity to intervene in order to assert her
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination because she had
a proprietary interest in the documents. 52 The issues that remained for the Court were (1) whether the taxpayer had lost her
fifth amendment privilege and (2) whether the taxpayer had a
right of privacy with respect to certain documents under the
fourth or fifth amendment.
In Couch, the Court said the fifth amendment privilege is a
personal one, adhering not to the information sought, but to the
person asserting the privilege.' Therefore, the element of compulsion is absent where the summons and the district court order
enforcing it are directed not against the taxpayer asserting the
privilege, but against the accountant. In distinguishing this case
from other cases where ownership and possession of documents
are conjoined, the Court cited" 4 United States v. Judson5t5 as an
months prior to his referral of the case to the Intelligence Division for criminal investigation. The court in Weingarden, while disregarding the good faith component of the
Donaldsontest, appears to limit the Services use of a summons prior to recommendation
for prosecution, if at such time, the summons is being used to obtain evidence solely for
criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1973) and
United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 766 (5th Cir. 1973) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). See
text accompanying notes 50-94 supra.
511. Throughout Part IV of the Symposium the term "summons" is intended to
represent both an administrative summons issued pursuant to §7602 of the INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954 and a search warrant. This is done because it is believed that the
legal rights and privileges of a taxpayer with respect to his evidentiary documents will be
identically interpreted whether an administrative summons or search warrant is issued.
See Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 31 AFTR 2d 73-1075 (9th Cir. 1973) and Hill v. Philpott,
445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Blank, 450 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1972).
See text accompanying notes 192-217 supra.
512. 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973). See text accompanying notes 95-116 supra.
513. 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973).
514. Id. at 330.
515. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). The court in Judson quotes Wigmore to the effect
that, when considering the question of possession for purposes of the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the attorney in possession of a client's documents is merely
holding the documents as an agent. Thus, if the documents would be compellable from
the client, the same would be true for the attorney; but, if the documents would not be
compellable from the client, they would not be compellable from the attorney. See also
United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 766 (5th Cir. 1973), rehearingdenied en banc, 73-2
USTC 119802, 82595 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting) and Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633
(2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). But see United States v. White, 477
F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 344 (M.D. Pa.
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example of a case where ownership and possession conjoin. In
Judson, the documents summoned (the taxpayer's records and
his accountant's workpapers and other memoranda used in completing a net worth statement) were in the possesion of Judson,
the taxpayer's attorney, who had obtained the documents prior
to the time the summons was issued. The Ninth Circuit held that
Judson could assert the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege.
Query: Did the Supreme Court in Couch hold that possession of
documents by an attorney is the same as possession by the client
so that ownership and possession of the documents are conjoined?
The effect of such a holding will be considered later. Justice Powell concluded the analysis of the fifth amendment by holding that
actual or constructive possession-"6 of documents and not ownership "bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment
protections against governmental compulsions upon the individ5 7
ual accused of crime". 1
Finally, the Court considered the taxpayer's argument that
the confidential nature of the accountant-client relationship and
the resulting expectation of privacy in transferring the records to
the accountant should protect the taxpayer under the fourth" '
and fifth" ' amendments from their production. The Court concluded that no confidential accountant-client privilege is recognized in federal courts, nor is there justification for the privilege
where tax records relevant to income tax returns are summoned
in a criminal investigation.5?2 With respect to the right of privacy
1973); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971); and United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp.
490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). See text accompanying notes 332-39 infra.
516. 409 U.S. 322, 333, n.16 (1973).
517. Id. at 333.
518. The right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment is the only aspect of the
fourth amendment considered in Couch. The Court noted that Couch's claim of her right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment was not
further articulated and appeared to be merged in her fifth amendment argument (419 U.S.
at 325 n.6).
519. The Court does not further articulate the relationship of the fifth amendment
to the right of privacy under the fourth amendment. See both dissenting opinions which
conclude there is a relationship between the fourth amendment right of privacy and the
fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Justice Douglas would
reverse the lower court because of his belief that the taxpayer's right of privacy under the
fourth and fifth amendment was violated. Justice Marshall would remand to determine
if the taxpayer's surrender of possession to the accountant for such a long period of time
was an abandonment of her expectation of privacy. See United States v. Schmidt, 360 F.
Supp. 339, 344 (M.D. Pa. 1973). See text accompanying notes 218-48 supra.
520. 409 U.S. at 335.
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under the fourth or fifth amendment, the Court held there could
be "little expectation of privacy" where tax records are handed
to an accountant for disclosure in an income tax return. 52' The
522
Court stated:
What information is not disclosed is largely in the accountant's
discretion, not [the taxpayer's]. Indeed, the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if he knowingly assists in the
preparation of a false return. . . . His own need for selfprotection would often require the right to disclose the information given him. [The taxpayer] seeks extensions of constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the very situation where obligations of disclosure exist and under a system
largely dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive.
[Emphasis supplied]
The Attorney Tax Return Preparer
In Part I of the Symposium, three questions, which are created but not answered by Couch, are presented. Question (1),
simply stated, is what would be the result if the accountant in
Couch were an attorney. The issue of possession for purposes of
the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination and the issue of a right or expectation of privacy
under the fourth or fifth amendment are reduced in importance
if it is established that an attorney-client privilege existssn with
respect to the tax records or workpapers transferred to an attorney for purposes of preparing an income tax return and for retaining along with any workpapers developed by the attorney for
purposes of a possible future civil or criminal income tax fraud
investigation. In any discussion concerning the attorney-client
privilege, it is assumed that the federal common law attorney52 1
client privilege is determinative.
In considering the availability of the attorney-client privilege
to tax return preparation, the courts have been principally concerned with two aspects of the privilege. First, whether the attorney is acting in his capacity as a professional legal adviser or,
stated another way, whether the services rendered are sufficiently
within the professional competence of an attorney. Secondly,
1521. Id.; see United States v. Hickok, 481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 378-86 supra.
522. 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
523. See text accompanying notes 482-508 supra.
524. See text accompanying notes 304-27 supra.
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whether the communications to the attorney are made in confidence or documents transferred are confidential in nature. Unfortunately, the early cases r2 considering whether tax return preparation is within the professional competence of an attorney involved accountants who also happened to be attorneys. Instead
of limiting their decisions to the holding that the attorney-client
privilege is not available when accountant-attorneys are holding
themselves out as accountants with respect to the particular work
requested by their clients, the courts, in dictum, implied that tax
return preparation is the work of an accountant and not within
the attorney-client privilege. 5
In a more recent case, 2 the Second Circuit adopted a more
realistic approach to the availability of the attorney-client privilege to tax return preparation. The court concluded that services
rendered in tax return preparation "are basically matters sufficiently within the professional competence of an attorney to make
them prima facie subject to the attorney-client privilege."5 2s How-

ever, it is still necessary to establish that th6 particular oral or
written communications involved in the claim of privilege are
communicated to an attorney in confidence.
In considering whether communications are transmitted to
an attorney in confidence, the court in United States v.
Threlkeld,521 relying on Colton, concluded that oral statements or
workpapers specifically transmitted to an attorney to insert on
the taxpayer's income tax return are not intended to be confidential because the return is prepared for submission to a third party,
the Internal Revenue Service. After concluding that the source of
information is not privileged, however, the court provided the
following test (hereinafter referred to as the Threlkeld test):"'
525. In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) and Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d
795 (9th Cir. 1954). Throughout this article, reference is made to attorneys and accountants. The references to accountants are intended in their broadest sense to include any
person who is not an attorney who aides taxpayers in the preparation of income tax
returns.
526. The dictum in Fisher and Olender has been followed in a recent case, United
States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D. Md. 1971). But see United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
527. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
528. Id. at 637. See United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
See text accompanying notes 256-60 supra.
529. 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). But see Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d
849 (8th Cir. 1966) and United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
530. 241 F. Supp. 324, 326 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). See also United States v. Schmidt,
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Information communicated by the client with the direction
that it not be inserted in the return or with the direction that it
be, or not be, so inserted in the discretion andjudgment of the
attorney need not be divulged unless [the attorney] has heretofore voluntarily divulged the contents of the communication to
an Internal Revenue agent in the course of [the attorney's]
representation of the client. [Emphasis supplied]
The application of this test would adequately protect taxpayers' confidential communications. The district court judge can
administer the test with in camera inspection of the documents." '
In those cases where the taxpayer is sufficiently knowledgeable
about the federal income tax law that he can either orally or by
workpapers transmit to the attorney information to be specifically inserted on the income tax return, it would be difficult to
argue that the taxpayer is seeking legal advice from the attorney
or that transferring such information onto the income tax return
would be within the professional competence of the attorney. The
converse is also true. In those cases where the taxpayer either
orally, by tax records, or by workpapers transmits raw data to an
attorney for the attorney to use his discretion to determine what
portion of such information to insert on the income tax return, it
would be difficult to argue that the taxpayer is seeking anything
other than legal advice from the attorney. Nor does it appear
arguable that such information is transmitted other than in con5
fidence. In fact, reality is ignored when it is argued, as in Couch, 2
that a taxpayer has no expectation of privacy when he transmits
raw data to an accountant so that the accountant, in his discretion and judgment, can extract the necessary information and
insert it on the income tax return.
Any professional person who extracts information from raw
data for purposes of inserting the extracted data on an income tax
return is giving legal advice. In order to determine which data is
to be extracted, the person must interpret a statute, the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. Although it might be argued that accountants and other non-attorney income tax return preparers are
violating state laws against practicing law without a license, the
360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Davis, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9339 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971); United
States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970); United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp.
490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
531. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 348 n.26 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
532. See text accompanying notes 520-21 supra.
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practicality of the situation is that there is an insufficient number
of attorneys to respond to the demand for tax return preparation
so that these state laws are and must be ignored. In fact, it can
be argued that accountants are more qualified to prepare income
tax returns involving complicated business transactions because
they are trained not only to interpret the tax law but also to
translate the results of complicated business transactions into
schedules, charts, or graphs that Internal Revenue agents are able
to understand.
Because attorneys and accountants render similar legal advice to taxpayers in preparing their income tax returns, Couch
presents the practical dilemma that to reach equality between
attorneys and accountants the attorney-client privilege would
have to be contracted. This is true because the courts113 refuse to
recognize a state-created accountant-client privilege or create a
federal common law accountant-client privilege for communications from a taxpayer to an accountant that would satisfy the
Threlkeld test.
Notwithstanding this dilemma, it is likely that the decision
in Couch would, or at least should, have been different if the tax
records and workpapers were in the possession of an attorney who
had prepared the income tax returns and retained permanent
possession of the tax records and workpapers for possible future
audit. The primary reason for this conclusion is that, in those
cases where the Threlkeld test is satisfied, the attorney can assert, 34 or the client should be permitted to intervene 35 and assert,
the attorney-client privilege. Workpapers or other documents
prepared by the attorney from the taxpayer's oral statements,
workpapers, or other documents that were not intended to be
inserted on the income tax return are also protected by the
3
attorney-client privilege.1 1
In addition, a different result should be reached if the documents are in an attorney's possession as a result of a few decisions, prior to Couch, where attorneys were successful in prevent533. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) and cases cited therein and
United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
960 (1959). See text accompanying notes 454-64 supra.
534. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2nd Cir. 1962) and Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956).
535. See text accompanying note 512 supra.
536. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345 (M.D. Pa. 1973); UnitedStates
v. Davis, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9339 (E.D. Mich. 1972); and United States v. Merrell, 303 F.
Supp. 490, 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
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ing enforcement of a summons by asserting the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimiantion rather than relying on
the attorney-client privilege. 37 The Couch decision supports
these cases if the taxpayer is considered to be in either actual or
constructive possession 3 8 of the documents in his attorney's
possession. As a matter of law, it should be easier for an attorney
to argue the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to tax
documents than to argue that possession by an attorney should
be treated differently than possession by an accountant for purposes of a taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self539
incrimination .
Finally, it should be argued that the Couch decision would
be different if an attorney were involved rather than an accountant because of the taxpayer's right of privacy under the fourth
or fifth amendment. The success of this argument will require a
court to recognize that possession of a taxpayer's documents by
an attorney is to be considered as either actual or constructive
possession by the taxpayer or that where a right of privacy is
available ownership rather than possession should be the basis for
the assertion of such right. The fourth amendment right of privacy is not independent but related to the fifth amendment privi5
lege against compulsory self-incrimination. 1
537. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1953); Application of House, 144
F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). But see United States v. Moore, 73-2 USTC 9748, 82439
(5th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
Compare United States v. Conte, 300 F. Supp. 73, 78 (D. Del. 1969).
538. See text accompanying note 515 supra where there is considered the argument,
that, for purposes of the Couch fifth amendment possession requirement, possession of
taxpayer's records by an attorney is treated as possession by the taxpayer.
539. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345 (M.D. Pa. 1973). See text
accompanying notes 413-23 supra.
540. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 766 (5th Cir. 1973), rehearingdenied en banc, 73-2
USTC 9802, 82600 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); United States v. Schdmit, 360 F. Supp.
;339, 344 (M.D. Pa. 1973). The new ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY in its
Ethical Consideration4-4 notes: "The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the
ethical obligationof a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. The ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source
of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." [Emphasis added]. It would
appear that such ethical obligations would prevent the attorney from asserting a right to
disclose confidential information of his client for the attorney's self-protection. See Couch,
409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973), for a contrary conclusion with respect to an accountant. See text
accompanying note 532, supra. But see United States v. Moore, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 9748,
82439 (5th Cir. 1973), where the court ignored, without explanation, any possibility that
there might be a difference if a taxpayer's documents are in the possession of an attorney
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Accountant or Attorney Tax Return Preparer: Retention of
Documents
The second question presented in Part I of the Symposium
is whether a taxpayer loses his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination if he transfers tax records and workpapers to an
accountant or an attorney to prepare his income tax return but
regains possession of his tax records and workpapers and any
workpapers or other documents prepared by the accountant or
the attorney prior to issuance of an Internal Revenue Service
summons. A further question is raised if the accountant or attorney retains photocopies of such documents. The Couch" ' decision
would resolve the question of the taxpayer's records and workpapers because a taxpayer retains his right to assert his fifth amendment privilege where ownership and possession are conjoined. In
such cases, it would not make any difference whether an accountant or an attorney had prepared the income tax return. A similar
result should be reached with respect to the accountant's or attorney's workpapers or other documents if they are returned to the
taxpayer by agreement, either in the initial retainer contract or
in a separate contract of sale, as the property of the taxpayer, or,
at least, returned to the taxpayer with the understanding that the
taxpayer can retain the workpapers in his rightful possession for
as long as he deems appropriate. Again, either ownership or right2
ful possession and actual possession are conjoined.
rather than an accountant. The court simply concluded that the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege disappeared in light of Couch without considering the taxpayer's "expectation of privacy". It is interesting to note that in United States v. Hodgson, 73-1 U.ST.C.
119419 (N.D. Okla. 1973) the court found that an attorney "might subject himself to a law
suit if he submitted the information and testimony in compliance with the summons and
failed to assert the attorney-client privilege." Compare United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d
99 (9th Cir. 1973). See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 338-39 (1973) where Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion stated:
By looking solely to the historical antecedents of the privilege [against
compulsory self-incrimination] and focusing, on the ingredient of personal compulsion, the majority largely ignores the interplay of the fundamental values
protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ....
Quoting from Murphy v. Waterfront Commissioner, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), Justice Douglas continued:
lOlur request for this inviolability of the human personality and of the right
of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life' is a
fundamental policy underlying the Fifth Amendment. [409 U.S. at 340]
See text accompanying notes 230-48 supra.
541. 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973).
542. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973). See also United States v.
Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); United
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Three pre-Couch cases, United States v. Post,54 3 United
States v. Widelski 44 and United States v. Pizzo545 held that a presummons transfer by an accountant of his workpapers to a taxpayer is ineffective to allow the taxpayer to assert his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. 47 All three cases concluded that ownership of the workpapers was retained by the
accountant so that rightful possession could not be claimed by
the taxpayer. The Court in Couch5 5 refused to decide what is
"rightful possession" for purposes of asserting the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the Court's
firm conclusion54 (that possession whether actual, constructive,
or rightful and not ownership bears the most significant relationship to the fifth amendment) should substantially reduce the
reliance in future cases on ownership of workpapers or other documents by a person other than the person asserting the privilege.
In addition, at least one pre-Couch case550 contains a statement
States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967); and Application of House, 144 F. Supp.
95, 102-103 (N.D. Cal. 1956). In Zakutansky, supra at 72, the workpapers transferred to
the taxpayer by the accountant were transferred after the summons was served on the
accountant. The court held the post-summons transfer to be ineffective to alter the rights
of the parties. See also United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971). But see
United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973), rehearingdenied en banc, 73-2 USTC
T9802, 82600 (5th Cir. 1973) where Judge Roney in his concurring opinion makes clear the
majority's holding that the taxpayer does not have a fifth amendment privilege with
respect to accountant's workpapers in the taxpayer's possession. It is the opinion of this
writer that this majority holding in White is an erroneous interpretation of the Couch
decision. It is difficult to understand the majority's interpretation of Couch in view of the
extremely lucid dissent of Judge Ainsworth (73-2 USTC 9802, 82595). The majority in
White imply that the decision would have been different if the accountant's workpapers
had been transferrpd to the taxpayer prior to the transfer to the attorney (477 F.2d at 763).
543. 72-2 U.S.T.C. 9626 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
544. 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971).
545. 260 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
546. See note 559 infra.
547. Compare United States v. Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1967).
548. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 n.12 (1973).
549. Id. at 333. See text accompanying notes 516-17, supra. See also United States
v. Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1967), where the court placed the burden of proving
ownership to defeat a claimed fifth amendment privilege on the government. But see
United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 458 n.4 (6th Cir. 1973).
550. United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 1967). The Cohen case was
cited favorably in the same footnote in Couch in which the court refused to decide what
is "rightful possession". The court in Cohen states:
There is authority [Judge Learned Hand in In re Grant, 198 F. 708, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1912), aff'd, 227 U.S. 74 (1913)] that possession of incriminating
documents is sufficient to support the privilege even though the possession is
wrongfully acquired and the owner has requested that the documents be returned.
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that even wrongful possession is a sufficient basis for a claim of
the privilege.
It is also clear55 ' that an accountant who has transferred all
tax records, workpapers and other documents to a taxpayer
should not retain photocopies of them because the photocopies
would be subject to an Internal Revenue Service summons.
Whether this result would be the same for an attorney depends
on whether the originals could be obtained by summons if the
originals had been retained by the attorney. 2 When photocopies
are retained by an attorney, there should not be any effect on the
attorney-client privilege. Retention of photocopies by an attorney, however, will prevent the attorney from asserting the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination or asserting the taxpayer's right of privacy because the taxpayer has neither ownership nor possession of the photocopies."' Also, the lack
of ownership of the photocopies might prevent intervention by the
taxpayer to assert his own legal rights and privileges."'
Accountant v. Attorney: Who Should Prepare Tax Returns?
At this point, an interesting question arises: Should attorneys rather than accountants prepare federal individual income
tax returns in order to maximize the protection of the legal rights
and privileges of taxpayers? Hopefully, this question will stimulate substantial debate between accountants and attorneys and
their respective professional associations, and result in greater
protection to taxpayers.
The Couch decision has eliminated any possibility that an
accountant who prepares a taxpayer's income tax return and retains possession of the tax records and workpapers can offer any
In Couch, the court cited at 331 n.14 the case of Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921)
in which the Supreme Court held that the legal owner of documents may not interpose

his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as to those documents even though
they were in the possession of an individual who had stolen them. The same should be
true if the person claiming the privilege has wrongfully acquired the documents. See
Cohen, Accountant's Workpapers in FederalTax Invstigations, 21 TAx L. REv. 183, 199
n.52 (1966). But compare United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1971). In
Egenberg, the court rejected an accountant's claim of privilege against self-incrimination
and required the accountant to turn over tax records of taxpayers whose returns he had
prepared to prove the accountant's tax liability. The Court attempts to distinguish Cohen
and hold that the taxpayer's superior right to the records prevents the accountant from
claiming the privilege. See note 542 supra.
551. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331 (1973).
552. See text accompanying notes 529-32 and 534-40, supra.
553. See supra note 515 and text accompanying notes 537-39 supra.
554. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) and supra note 512.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 8

Tax Symposium-Part IV
legal protection to his clients. Yet, in this writer's experience, at
least in major metropolitan areas most attorneys in large and
medium size law firms would be more traumatized than accountants if accountants were to stop preparing income tax returns.
These attorneys generally admit that accountants are better
trained to prepare necessary schedules required to portray the tax
consequences of business transactions. It is unfortunate that the
Supreme Court failed to consider the practical problem created
by its decision in Couch.55
As a result, it is necessary that procedures be developed to
permit the continued dominance of the tax return preparation
business by accountants and, at the same time, to adequately
protect taxpayers' legal rights and privileges. The following procedures " ' are intended to accomplish both results:
(1) In the agreement (preferably written) to prepare a federal income tax return, the accountant should agree that all
workpapers or other documents prepared by him from a taxpayer's oral communications, tax records, workpapers and other
documents are the property of the taxpayer.
(2) At the completion of the income tax return, the accountant should return to the taxpayer all his records, workpapers
and other documents, including those transferred to the accountant and those prepared by the accountant. The accountant
should advise the taxpayer to retain all these records, workpapers and other documents for purposes of possible Internal Revenue Service investigations. He should also advise the taxpayer
to consult him prior to the time the taxpayer discusses or meets
with any representative of the Internal Revenue Service concerning the taxpayer's tax liability for the appropriate year.
This procedure unexpectedly benefits the accountant by reducing costly filing space.
(3) Finally, the accountant should not retain any photocopies of any records, workpapers, or other documents returned
to the taxpayer. A photocopy of the income tax return and any
555. See text accompanying note 533, supra. See also Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 340 and 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
556. These procedures are designed only to provide a basis for the taxpayer or his
attorney to prevent the Internal Revenue Service from obtaining the accountant's workpapers or other documents for use in the investigation or later at trial. The procedures
will not prevent an Internal Revenue Service request or summons to the accountant to
testify. The same is true for an attorney tax return preparer unless the response to a
specific question would violate the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345
(M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Conte, 300 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D. Del. 1969).
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attached schedules
can be retained for the accountant's legal
55 7
protection.
If tax returns are prepared by an attorney, it would be advisable to follow the above procedures outlined for accountants in
order to maximize the protection of the taxpayer's legal rights
and privileges. If the attorney should decide not to follow the
above procedures and to retain the taxpayer's tax records and
workpapers and any workpapers or other documents he has prepared, he should provide in the written agreement with the taxpayer that all workpapers and other documents prepared by the
attorney are the property of the taxpayer. In appropriate jurisdictions, 5- this might be the basis for the attorney to assert or the
taxpayer to intervene and assert the taxpayer's privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination with respect to such workpapers or
other documents. In either case, the attorney should provide in a
written agreement with the taxpayer that in preparing the income
tax return he will give legal advice to the taxpayer and will use
his discretion in advising the taxpayer of the appropriate items
to include in the return.
Federal Civil or CriminalIncome Tax FraudInvestigations
The third question in Part I of the Symposium focuses on
federal civil and criminal income tax fraud investigations rather
than on preparation of federal income tax returns. In particular,
the question concerns itself with investigations where a taxpayer
is represented by an attorney, but his income tax return was
prepared by an accountant or other non-attorney tax return preparer. The first part of the question deals with whether the result
in Couch would be different if the facts were changed to a presummons rather than a post-summons"' transfer to an attorney.
557. The accountant risks criminal prosecution if he knowingly assists in the preparation of a false return. 26 U.S.C. §7602(2).
558. See note 537 supra.

559. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 n.9 (1973). The Court held that a
transfer after the summons was served cannot alter the constitutional or other legal rights
and obligations of the parties. Such rights and obligations become "fixed" when the
summons is served. The Court cited United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 72 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 and United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir.
1971). The corollary to the Supreme Court's holding that legal rights and obligations
become fixed when the summons is served should be that legal rights and obligations can
be altered by, at least, legal transfers of the summoned documents prior to the time the
summons is served. See note 550 supra. But see United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d
454, 458 n.4 (6th Cir. 1973) and United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, rehearingdenied
en banc, 73-2 USTC 9802 (5th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 340-71 supra.
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The second part of the question focuses on whether an intermediate transfer of the documents to a taxpayer who then transfers the
documents to his attorney would provide a different result. Another related question whose answer requires only an extension of
the analysis of this question is whether workpapers of an accountant assisting in the investigation, either at the direction of the
taxpayer or the attorney, can be brought within the legal rights
and privileges of the taxpayer to insulate them from the broad
authority of the Internal Revenue Service to summon taxpayer's
records.
The issues which must be considered in answering these two
questions are: (1) Does the transfer of a taxpayer's records, workpapers and other documents and the accountant's workpapers
and other documents by the accountant directly to the attorney
or by way of the taxpayer to the attorney bring them within the
protection of the attorney-client privilege? (2) Does the transfer
of all such documents by the accountant directly to the attorney
or by way of the taxpayer to the attorney permit the attorney to
assert or the taxpayer to intervene and assert the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination? or (3) Does the transfer of all such documents by the accountant directly to the attorney or by way of the taxpayer to the attorney permit the attorney
to assert or the taxpayer to intervene and assert the taxpayer's
expectation of privacy within the fourth or fifth amendment?
It is clear 6 " that the accountant's workpapers or other documents prepared prior to the time an attorney is retained (except
possibly where they are specifically prepared for purposes of sub560. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. White,
477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142
(8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v.
Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971); Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963);
Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963);
In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir.
1961); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); Sale v. United States, 228
F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Jacobs, 322
F. Supp. 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1967);
Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp.
886 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir. 1959); Application of House,
144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). See note 537 suprafor cases permitting attorney to assert

client's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination rather than attorney-client privilege.
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sequent communication with an attorney)5 6 ' are not brought
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege where they are
transferred by an accountant to an attorney. If an accountant's
workpapers or other documents, other than those prepared specifically for insertion on or attachment to the income tax return, are
returned to the taxpayer as his property and subsequently transferred by the taxpayer to an attorney for the sole purpose of aiding
the attorney's representation of the taxpayer in the investigation,
it is inconceivable that the courts would penalize such a transfer
and deter effective representation of taxpayers. Where an individual confidentially transfers documents he owns, or has in his
rightful possession, to an attorney to aid the attorney in his representation of the individual, the documents should fall within the
scope of the attorney-client privilege even where the documents
were prepared prior to the time the attorney was retained. Assuming that the courts will not permit the attorney to assert the
attorney-client privilege or the taxpayer's fourth or fifth amendment right with respect to the accountant's workpapers in the
attorney's possession, it is necessary for the attorney to allow the
taxpayer to retain possession of the workpapers or other documents prepared by the accountant before the attorney had been
retained.
Conflicts in interpretation5 6 2 do arise, however, when an accountant is retained to prepare workpapers or other documents
from the taxpayer's confidential communications for purposes of
assisting the attorney in the investigation. Essential to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege by an accountant employed
either by an attorney or at an attorney's request is that the accountant assist in providing legal advice rather than merely rendering accounting services, and the accountant or taxpayer asserting the privilege has the burden to establish that the accountant is acting primarily as a consultant to the attorney.6 3 The
561. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 n.4 (2nd Cir 1961).
562. Compare United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Crr. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 63.3 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299
(C.D. Cal. 1971); Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966); and Application of
House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); with the other cases cited in note 560, supra,
563. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2nd Cir. 1961); United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp.
1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1971); and Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338, 342 (D.N.D. 1966).
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conflicts arise in the application of this general rule to the many
different types of services that accountants are called on to perform for an attorney. In light of the following statement by Judge
Friendly in United States v. Kovel, courts, in considering the
application of the attorney-client privelege to the work of an accountant, should be more concerned that they are not placing in
jeopardy effective legal representation of taxpayers: 64
This analogy of the client speaking a foreign language is by
no means irrelevant to the appeal at hand. Accounting concepts
are a foreign language to some lawyers in almost all cases, and
to almost all lawyers in some cases. Hence the presence of an
accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the client, while
the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought
not destroy the privilege, any more than would that of the linguist in the second or third variations of the foreign language
theme discussed above; the presence of the accountant is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed
to permit.
Advice to Attorney Representing Taxpayer in an Investigation
When an attorney representing a taxpayer in an Internal
Revenue Service investigation is in need of an accountant's services, the attorney should employ the accountant (preferably a
different accountant than the one who prepared the income tax
return) in a written contract which provides that the accountant
is being employed for the purpose of assisting the attorney's legal
representation of a taxpayer. The contract should also provide
that any oral statements, tax records, or other documents be
transferred to the accountant in confidence, and that any workpapers or other documents prepared by the accountant will form
the basis of the attorney's legal advice to the taxpayer. In addition, the contract should provide that all workpapers or other
documents transferred to or prepared by the accountant be returned to the attorney, that no photocopies of any workpapers or
other documents be retained by the accountant, and that all such
documents remain the property of the taxpayer. If the taxpayer
employs the accountant at the request of an attorney, a written
contract designed to accomplish the same results should be executed.
564. 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2nd Cir. 1961).
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In any jurisdiction565 which permits the attorney in possession of the taxpayer's tax records, workpapers and other documents to assert the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory selfincrimination or the taxpayer's right of privacy, the contract suggested in the preceding paragraph between the attorney and the
accountant should provide the basis for the attorney to assert the
taxpayer's privilege or right. The proposed contract should also
provide the basis for the taxpayer to intervene 66 and assert his
constitutional rights.56 7 As stated earlier,6 8 a proper interpretation of the attorney-client privilege would provide the soundest
legal basis for deciding these issues. A proper interpretation
should even permit documents prepared by an accountant before
the attorney is retained and subsequently transferred to an attorney by the taxpayer to be covered by the attorney-client privilege.
As is true with respect to tax return preparation, 55 an accountant cannot offer a taxpayer any protection of his legal rights
and privileges where the taxpayer has made oral statements or
transferred tax records, workpapers, or other documents to the
accountant so that the accountant can represent him in an Internal Revenue Service investigation. If the accountant has in his
possession 57 any such documents or any workpapers or other documents he has completed in the course of preparing the tax return
or representing the taxpayer in the investigation, the Internal
Revenue Service can summon all such documents. 7'
Accountant v. Attorney: Who Should Represent Taxpayer in an
Investigation?
Thus, a question similar to that posed with respect to tax
return preparation arises: Should attorneys rather than accountants represent taxpayer's in federal civil and criminal income
tax fraud investigations in order to maximize protection of the
565. See notes 537 and 542 supra.
566. See note 512 supra. But see United States v. Moore, 73-2 USTC 9748, 82439
(5th Cir. 1973).
567. See note 540 supra.
568. See note 539 supra.
569. See text accompanying note 555 supra.
570. See Stuart v.United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969). In Stuart, the court
carved out an exception to actual possession in an accountant because the taxpayer's
documents were transferred to the accountant at the request and for the benefit of the
Internal Revenue Service agent.
571. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See text accompanying notes 40413 supra.
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legal rights and privileges of a taxpayer. The answer is yes where
there is the slightest possibility that the taxpayer is being or
might be investigated for federal civil or criminal income tax
fraud rather than an investigation that is and will always remain
an investigation of civil income tax liability (a routine civil income tax audit). If an accountant is requested to represent a
taxpayer whose return he prepared in a federal civil income tax
investigation, it is arguable that he is the most efficient and perhaps the most qualified representative because of his familiarity
with the taxpayer's personal and business financial activities. If
the investigation does not proceed beyond a routine civil income
tax audit, it doesn't matter whether an accountant or an attorney
is representing the taxpayer. It is, however, often impossible to
predict when an investigation has left the stage of a routine civil
audit and progressed into a civil or criminal income tax fraud
investigation.5 7 2 Even where detection is accomplished, the detection is often made too late to adopt any procedures to protect the
taxpayer's evidence.
If a taxpayer has filed a fraudulent income tax return, a
professional's advice with respect to the legal consequences of the
taxpayer's decision whether or not to cooperate with the Internal
Revenue Service cannot be given too soon. As a result, if there is
the slightest doubt in an accountant's mind that the income tax
return filed by a taxpayer who has been notified of a pending
Internal Revenue Service investigation (even a routine civil income tax audit) is not substantially correct or if there is the
slightest question of such taxpayer's frankness in divulging information to the accountant, the clear implication from the Couch
decision is that the accountant should immediately advise the
taxpayer to obtain legal representation for the investigation. If
the accountant had prepared the income tax return and had retained any originals or photocopies of records, workpapers, or
other documents of the taxpayer or any workpapers or other documents prepared by him, he should immediately deliver them to
the taxpayer as property of the taxpayer or at least for retention
by the taxpayer for as long as the taxpayer deems necessary.573 If
572. It is beyond the scope of this Symposium to consider the different techniques or
signals used to detect this transformation. See Mitchell, Fundamentalsof Recognizing a
Tax FraudInvestigation, 3 MEMP. ST. L. REV. 221 (1973) and Garbis and Sack, Diagnosis
of Tax Fraud Investigations, 55 A.B.A.J. 441 (1969).
573. One of the most disturbing facts I have discovered in the research for this article
is the number of cases taxpayer's have lost or almost lost because their accountants
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an accountant did not prepare the income tax return but is consulted by a taxpayer for representation in an investigation, he
should follow the same procedures when he first realizes the income tax return might be incorrect.
In order to insure that an attorney is consulted in ample time
to provide legal protection to a taxpayer, the accountant is obligated to examine thoroughly the income tax return and all relevant documentary evidence to determine their accuracy prior to
any meetings with an agent of the Internal Revenue Service. It is
advisable that an accountant should go to the taxpayer's premises to perform the work for the taxpayer and leave all documents
in the taxpayer's possession. If it is absolutely necessary to do any
work in the accountant's office, the accountant should contract
with the taxpayer that he is only temporarily removing the documents from taxpayer's possession and will return the documents
immediately after the work is completed.
The procedures outlined in the preceding paragraph should
be followed even where an accountant believes he is more qualified to represent the taxpayer because complicated business
transactions require analysis or net worth statements must be
prepared. In such cases, the attorney can employ an accountant
to assist him in representing the taxpayer so that the work product of the accountant can be cloaked with the maximum legal
protection available to the taxpayer.-"
Once the taxpayer's file has been referred to the Intelligence
Division of the Internal Revenue Service or a special agent is
conducting the investigation, although possibly too late, an acdemanded the return of documents in the taxpayer's or his attorney's possession. See Deck
v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (C.A.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); In re
Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Post, 72-2 U.S.T.C. 19626 (E.D. Ky.
1972); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1967). But see, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464,
469 (9th Cir. 1967). Experience demonstrates that too many taxpayers seek professional
income tax assistance not for the technical expertise of the professional but because the
taxpayer believes the professional has a working relationship with employees of the Internal Revenue Service that will allow the professional to gain concessions for his clients.
Experience also demonstrates that many professionals attempt to develop such relationships in order to receive such concessions or, at least, to hold themselves out to their clients
as maintaining such relationships. This is not intended to imply any criminal activity on
the part of the professional, but to the extent that an acountant is concerned with maintaining a working relationship with an Internal Revenue Service agent, he can jeopardize
the legal rights and privileges of a client. This is probably the reason the accountants in
the above listed cases sought to obtain their workpapers from the taxpayers.If this is the
case, it would appear to be at least ethically unsound.
574. See text accompanying notes 563-64 supra.
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countant should immediately advise a taxpayer to obtain an attorney and follow the above outlined procedures.
When an attorney is employed to represent a taxpayer in an
income tax investigation, the most important decision he will be
required to make is whether or not to advise the taxpayer to
cooperate' 5 with the revenue or special agent. As stated before,
this decision cannot be made too soon for the taxpayer who has
filed a fraudulent return. Thus, the attorney is obligated to examine thoroughly the income tax return and all other evidentiary
documents and to thoroughly cross-examine the taxpayer to insure that the taxpayer has been truthful with respect to his personal and business financial transactions for the tax year or years
in question. The client must be made to realize the importance
of the cooperation decision, and that intelligent advice can only
be given if the attorney is fully informed of all the facts.
As stated in the introduction, an attorney representing a
taxpayer in a federal criminal income tax fraud investigation is
concerned as much with proving weaknesses in the government's
case as he is in proving the innocence of the taxpayer. To the
extent that the attorney is reasonably confident that he will be
able to prevent the enforcement of an Internal Revenue Service
summons seeking to obtain originals or photocopies of the taxpayer's financial records or workpapers or other documents relating to the taxpayer's income tax return in his or the taxpayer's
possession, he will have substantially increased the government's
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, it
is possible that a decision not to cooperate could be financially
devastating to your client. The government's decision not to prosecute does not prevent assessment of civil tax liability. When
civil tax liability is at issue, the taxpayer has the burden of proof
which will be difficult to maintain without releasing his tax records and other documents that might otherwise incriminate
him. Also, it is likely that the government will attempt an assessment of the fifty percent of deficiency civil income tax fraud
penalty' " because its burden of proof 7" is only by a preponder575. See Crawley, Constructing a Defense to Tax Fraud Charges, in TAx FRAUD,
edited by HOLMFS and Cox, 159 (1973); Brosnahan, Representing a Client in a Criminal
Tax Investigation, 18 PRAc. LAWYER 67 (1972); and Lipton, Facing the PotentialFraud
Case: A PracticalGuide for Practitioners,36 J. TAXATION 242 (1972).
576. 26 U.S.C. §6653 (b).
577. 26 U.S.C. §7454 (a).
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ance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, the use of such a noncooperation tactic should be adopted
only where absolutely necessary, and then only after the taxpayer
fully understands the possible financial consequences of its use.
On the other hand, the taxpayer should be informed that the
Internal Revenue Service does not actively publicize a conviction
for civil tax fraud. Generally, the only publicity that is associated
with a civil tax fraud case is the published court report, and then
only where the taxpayer has decided to litigate. By contrast, the
public is made fully aware of a criminal tax fraud prosecution
through Internal Revenue Service press releases. Although this
publicity is intended to deter others from committing tax fraud,
it can also destroy the future earning potential of the taxpayer.
As if that is not enough, the taxpayer should be informed that his
present assets might be wiped out because a conviction for criminal tax fraud will be followed by an assessment of the correct civil
income tax liability and the fifty percent of deficiency civil income tax fraud penalty.
Conclusion
As noted throughout the Symposium, there are many unresolved issues with respect to a taxpayer's legal rights and privileges in federal civil and criminal income tax fraud investigations. Because of the growing number of conflicts in the lower
federal courts, the Supreme Court will be required to resolve
many of these issues in the next few years. After the current
Supreme Court decision in Couch, it can only be hoped that at
least six Justices will reconsider their interpretation of the Bill of
Rights as it is applied to federal civil and criminal income tax
fraud.
Until such time as many of these issues are resolved, accountants and attorneys involved in federal income tax return preparation and in representing taxpayers in federal civil and criminal
income tax fraud investigations are obligated to keep abreast of
the rapidly changing state of the law in their respective jurisdictions. This obligation should be shared by their respective associations. In addition, accountants and attorneys will be required
to be imaginative in modifying their procedures to offset changes
in the law in order to offer the maximum protection possible to
their clients' legal rights and privileges. So long as the decisions
of the courts continue shifting the balancing process away from
interpreting the Bill of Rights to protect the rights of taxpayers
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toward interpreting the Bill of Rights to mollify the proponents
of "law and order," it is certain that agents of the Internal Revenue Service will be modifying their investigative techniques to
the disadvantage of taxpayers. 578
578. An interesting development has occurred in the case of Vonder Ahe v. Howland,
31 AFTR2d 73-1075 (9th Cir. 1973). The case was unanimously decided (in this writer's
opinion, correctly decided) in March, 1973, and unofficially reported, but has not been
officially reported to date. It is my understanding that at least one judge has reconsidered
his opinion and has requested an en banc consideration of the case by the 15 judges of
the Ninth Circuit.
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